The British Empire in India, other than the local elites, relied upon a large portion of one institution more than any other: its military, or troopers who likewise ended up being the contributing factor why they later left India.
During their rule in India, the British maintained a vast military to safeguard their resources, invade foreign lands and keep command over the domestic environment so as to reinforce their mandate and expand the trade for ruling elites. Hence, the military ended up as one of the most vital organs in the working of the Empire, both internally and externally.
While far from any doubt majority of institutions even in British India suffered due to the absence of quality and appropriate administration, but the British Indian Army was one institution that was found in a state which would impress even the most snobbish Western observers, alongside railway system helping the Empire in trade and educational institutions which helped in creating a new class for the business elites.
Later upon their departure in 1947, the British Indian Army likewise divided between two countries and right up till the present time, have kept their core standards and principles.
In Pakistan, for instance, the entire nation and nearly it's each institution suffer from quality and disparity, however Pakistan Army, on the other hand, is one foundation that would, as referred prior, impress even the most snobbish Western observers. Their role in not of typical civil servants as in other nations (not the case with low ranked officers), but that of powerful celebrities who view the civilians as a collective nuisance, easily undermined or ignored—a thinking inherited from their colonial founding fathers. Their official language, as being a colonial institution wound up English and in reality, all quirks from feasting to the ranks are altogether anglicized and adapted from the British Indian Army—an army which comprised of locals who fought against their own kin for the outsiders. Indeed, even in the mess today, the officers and cadets, who are called “sahib” (the name called for British officers in India) wear the uniforms (which closely resemble those of the British Armed Forces) and Western suits, while low ranked officers and hirelings are called by the ranks of the Army of the Mughal Empire, and are frequently restricted to wearing customary Pakistani dresses, creating a sense of local traditions as mediocre—a strategy used by the colonizers amid Raj to embed a sense of inferiority in the locals.
Imran Khan in his autobiography, “Pakistan: A Personal History” describes:
“During their time in India, the British had embedded an inferiority complex amongst the natives with great care. Waiters and attendants were made to wear the clothes of Mughal army officers and the Mughal aristocracy, while the officers of the symbols of British power, the army, the police, and the civil service, wore the dress of the colonials.”
A retired army officer in this way endeavors to spend the rest of his living as a Western citizen, considering the local traditions and its followers as nonsensical.
The current class, in any case, is not altogether responsible for such behavior for they inherited the traits to feel and act superior over the regular folks who, as indicated by them, are meant to be ruled by someone above them either directly or controlled indirectly.
Geoffrey Langlands, a retired British Major, and a teacher who, aged 30 at the time, chose to remain in Pakistan after the partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947. Serving the British Indian Army and Pakistani Army as a part of his service tenure, he once stated:
“When independence came, they asked British officers to volunteer to stay on for one year to train up the new army. I had every intention of returning home but volunteered to stay behind for a while.”
Afterward, he spent more than 70 years working with us here. In fact, Langlands was just one of the numerous British officers who prepared and developed the essential standards for the Pakistani and Indian armed forces upon partition.
In the first place, because most senior serving officers in the British Indian Army, which later separated into two armed forces, were the Englishmen as being the rulers, without whom a military cannot work. Second, their sophisticated manners to be transferred into the new batch which will later be secured through their kinship for decades to come. In fact, in the first decade after its establishment in 1947, all the commandants of Pakistan Military Academy were British officers and in fact, all the early heads of Pakistan Air Force and Navy were also Englishmen. Indeed, even the site of the institute they inherited had at first been utilized as the premises of a PT and Mountaineering School of the British Indian Army, and later it turned into the premises of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps. Also, the vast majority of the currently used sites, whether cantonment, garrisons, mess, resorts, grounds, clubs or even cemeteries are colonial built and inherited upon the partition, similar to India, and new structures and neighborhoods often hugely depicts the colonial styles and names rather than the local in the both countries today, where the access is restricted for ordinary citizens to maintain the order, same as non–Europeans were not permitted in the British neighborhoods and workplaces amid the Raj.
The underlying foundations of these establishments, as referenced prior, go far more profound than simply the partying of the Indian subcontinent and how the two—later three—dominant nations work today. As explained by Francis Fukuyama, an American political scientist, economist, and author, the colonial powers left three institutions in the former colonies as a legacy after the decolonization: The bureaucracy, military, and democracy. The bureaucracy and military were strengthened by the colonial governments so in order to maintain strong command over the domestic environment. Democracy, however, did not flourish as the locals were not used to of the self–government, especially in the case of India due to the long existence of the caste system here who have not ruled themselves for over 7 centuries.
After decolonization, the nascent states had strong institutions of bureaucracy and military as it was much easier to maintain than to establish something. While the democracy, which these newly independent civilians had to form, was relatively a weaker institution and got influenced by the other two powerful authorities. This led to a strong grip of the former two institutions on the state of affairs in the decolonized states such as India and Pakistan who stood above the law and interfered in the democratic process, whereas the democratic institutions itself were not as developed as in the case of Western societies.
In 7 decades of Pakistan's independence, it had seen 22 prime ministers and none of them has ever finished a full term; they either surrendered, terminated, completed the term they did not start or were assassinated. On the other hand, there are also three successful military coups, who ruled the nation for no less than 7 back to back years each—taking up a significant segment from the whole history of the young country.
Though it would not be reasonable to disregard the progress Pakistan made amid those overthrows, however in all actuality, a nation never needs short–term settlements that military rule provides, but the long–term socio–economic effects that can only be formed by a civilian government in a country.
There is, at present, a serious divide between the military and the civilian government crafted by years of disagreements between them and each misstep is blamed on their not being on the same page. Every leadership in Pakistan, whether corrupt or fair, then, is inevitably shaped by its relationship with Pakistan's most powerful authority: Its military, who have ruined the nation's progress by experimenting on the matters beyond their scope.
The army, at times, is also credited for being the most honest institution in Pakistan today, where they stand for their high qualities, standards, and morals not to be found elsewhere in the country. Be that as it may, what is frequently overlooked is the means by which they are secure in a country where some other citizen without any affiliation with the army suffers. The military, in reality, is the most privileged and resourceful institution in Pakistan today, as talked about prior in the chapter, capable of affording honesty and keeping their high morals similar to that of British in India, who looted the resources which in the eyes of the locals never existed. It is, as it were, a little West inside the East; the army's spending takes up around the detected 18 percent of the total budget, which is a colossal decrease from the 1980s when it was taking up to 60 percent of it. They additionally own the largest group of companies and one of the largest energy conglomerates companies in Pakistan. The army's oligarchs have appropriated a remarkable amount of the country's wealth; they have substantial investments in the oil-and-gas industry and own shopping centers, clubs, farms, banks, and factories. Members of the army are even believed to traffic in narcotics, guns, mercenaries and involved in assassinations of prominent national figures. While locals, and now the civilians are still in the huge absence of the resources British once enjoyed in India and then inherited by the elites and the army, secured in the name of same defense budget the British told the natives they use to protect them from the foreign invasions, while doing so themselves at the same time.
In addition, Pakistan, similar to India, has always maintained a purely volunteered military which caused them to keep their privileged institutions restricted to a selected few, often supported by kinship in the old times, much the same as amid the Raj. It was actually after the events of 1857—the War of Independence, also called the Indian Rebellion—that the British Empire began to exclude certain groups from the colonial army, far from abilities and near to ‘martial races,’ on a systematic basis.
Most of the populace, at that point, must be corrupt as a natural response to the unjust division of wealth, in an effort to secure themselves for their future—making it the only best way to development for these conservative minds. Officers live behind high walls, in manicured compounds and avail themselves luxury entertainments unimaginable to an average Pakistani. Armed force officers send their children to special schools similar to the elites and avail special hospitals where regular citizens are frequently overlooked. They separate themselves from society in an effort to keep their institutions clean, much like the local elites, and make great efforts to justify their theories.
Ayesha Siddiqa, an independent author, military scientist, and a political analyst who has written scathingly of the military, once quoted:
“The Pakistani Army is like a mafia. The Army has its own interests, and it will eliminate any opposition to those interests, including civilian governments.”
Every nation has its specific institutions who mark a vital place in its working by staying and developing in its own scope. Whenever one attempts to outperform the other individually, not only does it affects its own working overtime, but also handicaps the other, creating a vacuum in the development of the nation, collectively.
______________________
During their rule in India, the British maintained a vast military to safeguard their resources, invade foreign lands and keep command over the domestic environment so as to reinforce their mandate and expand the trade for ruling elites. Hence, the military ended up as one of the most vital organs in the working of the Empire, both internally and externally.
While far from any doubt majority of institutions even in British India suffered due to the absence of quality and appropriate administration, but the British Indian Army was one institution that was found in a state which would impress even the most snobbish Western observers, alongside railway system helping the Empire in trade and educational institutions which helped in creating a new class for the business elites.
Later upon their departure in 1947, the British Indian Army likewise divided between two countries and right up till the present time, have kept their core standards and principles.
In Pakistan, for instance, the entire nation and nearly it's each institution suffer from quality and disparity, however Pakistan Army, on the other hand, is one foundation that would, as referred prior, impress even the most snobbish Western observers. Their role in not of typical civil servants as in other nations (not the case with low ranked officers), but that of powerful celebrities who view the civilians as a collective nuisance, easily undermined or ignored—a thinking inherited from their colonial founding fathers. Their official language, as being a colonial institution wound up English and in reality, all quirks from feasting to the ranks are altogether anglicized and adapted from the British Indian Army—an army which comprised of locals who fought against their own kin for the outsiders. Indeed, even in the mess today, the officers and cadets, who are called “sahib” (the name called for British officers in India) wear the uniforms (which closely resemble those of the British Armed Forces) and Western suits, while low ranked officers and hirelings are called by the ranks of the Army of the Mughal Empire, and are frequently restricted to wearing customary Pakistani dresses, creating a sense of local traditions as mediocre—a strategy used by the colonizers amid Raj to embed a sense of inferiority in the locals.
Imran Khan in his autobiography, “Pakistan: A Personal History” describes:
“During their time in India, the British had embedded an inferiority complex amongst the natives with great care. Waiters and attendants were made to wear the clothes of Mughal army officers and the Mughal aristocracy, while the officers of the symbols of British power, the army, the police, and the civil service, wore the dress of the colonials.”
A retired army officer in this way endeavors to spend the rest of his living as a Western citizen, considering the local traditions and its followers as nonsensical.
The current class, in any case, is not altogether responsible for such behavior for they inherited the traits to feel and act superior over the regular folks who, as indicated by them, are meant to be ruled by someone above them either directly or controlled indirectly.
Geoffrey Langlands, a retired British Major, and a teacher who, aged 30 at the time, chose to remain in Pakistan after the partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947. Serving the British Indian Army and Pakistani Army as a part of his service tenure, he once stated:
“When independence came, they asked British officers to volunteer to stay on for one year to train up the new army. I had every intention of returning home but volunteered to stay behind for a while.”
Afterward, he spent more than 70 years working with us here. In fact, Langlands was just one of the numerous British officers who prepared and developed the essential standards for the Pakistani and Indian armed forces upon partition.
In the first place, because most senior serving officers in the British Indian Army, which later separated into two armed forces, were the Englishmen as being the rulers, without whom a military cannot work. Second, their sophisticated manners to be transferred into the new batch which will later be secured through their kinship for decades to come. In fact, in the first decade after its establishment in 1947, all the commandants of Pakistan Military Academy were British officers and in fact, all the early heads of Pakistan Air Force and Navy were also Englishmen. Indeed, even the site of the institute they inherited had at first been utilized as the premises of a PT and Mountaineering School of the British Indian Army, and later it turned into the premises of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps. Also, the vast majority of the currently used sites, whether cantonment, garrisons, mess, resorts, grounds, clubs or even cemeteries are colonial built and inherited upon the partition, similar to India, and new structures and neighborhoods often hugely depicts the colonial styles and names rather than the local in the both countries today, where the access is restricted for ordinary citizens to maintain the order, same as non–Europeans were not permitted in the British neighborhoods and workplaces amid the Raj.
The underlying foundations of these establishments, as referenced prior, go far more profound than simply the partying of the Indian subcontinent and how the two—later three—dominant nations work today. As explained by Francis Fukuyama, an American political scientist, economist, and author, the colonial powers left three institutions in the former colonies as a legacy after the decolonization: The bureaucracy, military, and democracy. The bureaucracy and military were strengthened by the colonial governments so in order to maintain strong command over the domestic environment. Democracy, however, did not flourish as the locals were not used to of the self–government, especially in the case of India due to the long existence of the caste system here who have not ruled themselves for over 7 centuries.
After decolonization, the nascent states had strong institutions of bureaucracy and military as it was much easier to maintain than to establish something. While the democracy, which these newly independent civilians had to form, was relatively a weaker institution and got influenced by the other two powerful authorities. This led to a strong grip of the former two institutions on the state of affairs in the decolonized states such as India and Pakistan who stood above the law and interfered in the democratic process, whereas the democratic institutions itself were not as developed as in the case of Western societies.
In 7 decades of Pakistan's independence, it had seen 22 prime ministers and none of them has ever finished a full term; they either surrendered, terminated, completed the term they did not start or were assassinated. On the other hand, there are also three successful military coups, who ruled the nation for no less than 7 back to back years each—taking up a significant segment from the whole history of the young country.
Though it would not be reasonable to disregard the progress Pakistan made amid those overthrows, however in all actuality, a nation never needs short–term settlements that military rule provides, but the long–term socio–economic effects that can only be formed by a civilian government in a country.
There is, at present, a serious divide between the military and the civilian government crafted by years of disagreements between them and each misstep is blamed on their not being on the same page. Every leadership in Pakistan, whether corrupt or fair, then, is inevitably shaped by its relationship with Pakistan's most powerful authority: Its military, who have ruined the nation's progress by experimenting on the matters beyond their scope.
The army, at times, is also credited for being the most honest institution in Pakistan today, where they stand for their high qualities, standards, and morals not to be found elsewhere in the country. Be that as it may, what is frequently overlooked is the means by which they are secure in a country where some other citizen without any affiliation with the army suffers. The military, in reality, is the most privileged and resourceful institution in Pakistan today, as talked about prior in the chapter, capable of affording honesty and keeping their high morals similar to that of British in India, who looted the resources which in the eyes of the locals never existed. It is, as it were, a little West inside the East; the army's spending takes up around the detected 18 percent of the total budget, which is a colossal decrease from the 1980s when it was taking up to 60 percent of it. They additionally own the largest group of companies and one of the largest energy conglomerates companies in Pakistan. The army's oligarchs have appropriated a remarkable amount of the country's wealth; they have substantial investments in the oil-and-gas industry and own shopping centers, clubs, farms, banks, and factories. Members of the army are even believed to traffic in narcotics, guns, mercenaries and involved in assassinations of prominent national figures. While locals, and now the civilians are still in the huge absence of the resources British once enjoyed in India and then inherited by the elites and the army, secured in the name of same defense budget the British told the natives they use to protect them from the foreign invasions, while doing so themselves at the same time.
In addition, Pakistan, similar to India, has always maintained a purely volunteered military which caused them to keep their privileged institutions restricted to a selected few, often supported by kinship in the old times, much the same as amid the Raj. It was actually after the events of 1857—the War of Independence, also called the Indian Rebellion—that the British Empire began to exclude certain groups from the colonial army, far from abilities and near to ‘martial races,’ on a systematic basis.
Most of the populace, at that point, must be corrupt as a natural response to the unjust division of wealth, in an effort to secure themselves for their future—making it the only best way to development for these conservative minds. Officers live behind high walls, in manicured compounds and avail themselves luxury entertainments unimaginable to an average Pakistani. Armed force officers send their children to special schools similar to the elites and avail special hospitals where regular citizens are frequently overlooked. They separate themselves from society in an effort to keep their institutions clean, much like the local elites, and make great efforts to justify their theories.
Ayesha Siddiqa, an independent author, military scientist, and a political analyst who has written scathingly of the military, once quoted:
“The Pakistani Army is like a mafia. The Army has its own interests, and it will eliminate any opposition to those interests, including civilian governments.”
Every nation has its specific institutions who mark a vital place in its working by staying and developing in its own scope. Whenever one attempts to outperform the other individually, not only does it affects its own working overtime, but also handicaps the other, creating a vacuum in the development of the nation, collectively.
______________________
